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CASE COMMENTS

Rape: Challenging the Pedestals of Patriarchy
A recent decision of the Supreme Court on the significance of
corroboratory evidence in rape cases, might lead to more convictions in
rape cases, while at the same time reinforcing traditional assumptions
about women and the notion of 'chastity'.
In the State of Rajasthan v Shri Narayan, Koyali complained that she
was raped by her brother-in law, Narayan, on the morning of October 32,
1976 when she had gone to the cattle shed to seNe fodder to the cattle. 1
Narayan followed Koyali into the cattle shed, gagged her and then raped
her. A complaint was subsequently lodged and Narayan was arrested and
convicted by the Sessions Judge. He was sentenced to two years of
rigorous imprisonment and fined Rs.1000. In 1988, the High Court
reversed the order of conviction and sentence, and acquitted the accused.
The single judge of the High Court held that it seemed "improbable
that somebody will choose that hour of the day for committing forcible
rape with a lady in a bada (shed) which is just near the public way." 2
He further held that it was inconceivable that a man would commit rape
with a women who was his sister-in-law "without any rhyme or reason
and that too in day time."3 The delay of two days also convinced the
judge that the entire story was fabricated.4 As regards the evidence, in
particular her injuries, the High Court judge stated:
Her husband was with her during the inteNening period of two
days, and therefore, it cannot be ruled out that all these injuries
have been received by her while cohabiting with her husband
because [the] duration of injuries does not tally with the time of
the occurrence. S
The Supreme Court overturned the acquittal and rejected the findings
of the High Court. In the course of its decision the Court made some
progressive statements as regards the question of corroboration, which
requires that the prosecution produce evidence supporting or validating
1
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Id. at 2006 para 2.
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the claim of the raped woman. It held that " ...ordinarily the court should
have no hesitation in accepting [the victims] version regarding the
incident."6 The Court emphasised that a woman who is a victim of rape
is in the same position as an injured witness and her evidence should
receive the same weight.?
In overturning the decision of the High Court, the Supreme Court
stated:
... [I]t is not possible to believe that when a married woman has
sex with her husband in the privacy of their bedroom she would
suffer abrasions on her body and vaginal waIls.8
The Court concluded that the abrasions, swelling and inflammation
in the vaginal area was sufficient corroborative evidence that someone
else had forcible sex with Koyali, and that someone could not be a
husband as no husband would inflict such injuries on his wife. It further
held that as Koyali's relations with Narayan were not strained, she had
no motive to "falsely involve'the accused in the commission of a crime
which would put her chastity at stake".9 In rejecting the holding of the
High Court that as the cow shed was situated at a short distance from a
public road it would not be possible to believe a person would try to
have forcible sex with a woman near such a busy place, the Court stated:
It seems that the accused was lust-ridden and seeing the
prosecutrix alone lost control over himself and took her by force.
There is nothing surprising in the conduct of a man who is lustridden in behaving in a carefree manner trying to make the most
of the situation of the prosecutrix being alone and helpless. 10
While the Narayan case is a welcome restatement of an increasingly
progressive position on the question of corroboration, it is in many other
respects problematic in so far as it reinforces traditional and sexist
assumptions about women's sexuality, and the nature of violence in their
lives. For example, the Court bases its decision, in part, on the very
impossibility of marital rape - that is - on the impossibility of a woman
sustaining such injuries from sexual intercourse with her husband. This
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assumption is based on a denial of the extensive reality of physical and
sexual violence to which women are subject in their own homes by their
own husbands.
In this respect, the Narayan case mirrors many of the Court's decisions
in rape cases over the last decade. In Rafiq v. the State of V.P., the
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man for the rape of a woman
working in a village welfare organisation.11 The Supreme Court dismissed
a further appeal. Responding to the contention by the appellants that
there were no injuries on the victim's body, the Court held that
corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of a
victim was not a matter of law, but a guidance of prudence under given
circumstances. Justice Krishna Iyer stated ••...when no woman of honour
will accuse another of rape since she sacrifices thereby what is dearest to
her, the court cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist on corroborative
testimony ... "12 On this basis the Court rejected the argument that the
absence of injuries on the woman's body was sufficient to disprove the
allegation that she had been raped.
This approach was further developed in 1983 in the case of Bharwada
Bhogibhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, where the Court stated:
In [the] Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim
of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule is
adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or
the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be
viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with
doubt, disbelief or suspicion? To do so is to justify the charge of
male chauvinism in a male dominated society. We must analyse
the argument in support of the need for corroboration ... with our
feet firmly planted on the soil of India and with our eyes focussed
on the Indian horizon. We must not be swept off the feet by the
approach made in the Western world which has its own social
milieu, its own social mores, its own permissive values, and its
own code of life. Corroboration may be considered essential to
establish a sexual offence in the backdrop of the social ecology
of the Western world .... 13
The Court further held that a girl or woman in India is unlikely to
make false allegations of sexual assault for a number of reasons. A girl
11
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or a woman in "the tradition bound non-permissive society of India
would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is
likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred" ; she would be
conscious of the likelihood of being ostracised or looked down upon by
society including her own family members, relatives, friends, and
neighbours; she would face the risk of losing the "love and respect of her
own husband" and the happiness of the matrimonial home would be
shattered; if she was unmarried, it would be difficult for her to find a
match in a "respectable or an acceptable family"; there would be a
natural inclination to avoid giving publicity to the incident for the sake
of the "family name and family honour"; she would fear being considered
promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of
her innocence; and finally she would have to take the risk of not being
believed by the Court. 14
A similar approach was adopted in the State of Maharashtra v.
Kewalchand Jain. 15 The Court held that the victim of a sex offence could
not be put on par with an accomplice because she was the victim of the
crime. Her evidence had to be given the same weight as that attached to
an injured person in cases of physical violence. The reasons for not
insisting on corroboration were stated as follows:
It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her story
of woe will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material
particulars as in the case of an accomplice to a crime. Ours is a
conservative society where it concerns sexual behaviour.. ..Courts
must...realise
that ordinarily a woman ... will not stake her
reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her chastity. 16
The Court went on to add that a raped woman would suffer "a
tremendous sense of shame and the fear of being shunned by society and
her near relatives, including her husband."I? She would not be treated
with the compassion and understanding given to an injured victim of a
crime, but more often than not, regarded as a sinner and shunned. For
these reasons she would be slow and hesitant to bring a charge of rape
and the Court must evaluate her evidence in this context.18
These cases are important in so far as they have reduced the
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requirement of corroboration in rape cases. The trend of decisions over
the past decade on the question of corroboration appear in one sense to
be progressive, in so far as the victim ought to be believed. The
presumption that a victim of a rape case should be treated the same as
any other injured witness and her evidence should be given the same
weight as evidence given by victims in any other case of physical violence
can only benefit victims of rape. The shift away from putting her on par
with the accomplice and treating her evidence as unacceptable unless it
is corroborated destroys to some extent the myth that women lie about
rape. It reflects the fact that women cannot and do not make baseless
allegations of rape because of innumerable familial, societal and legal
impediments.
However, at the same time, these decisions all continue to be based
on problematic assumptions about women's sexuality, and the reality of
sexual violence in women's lives. The Court repeatedly emphasises the
importance of the victim's chastity. The violation in these cases is seen
first and foremost to the woman's chastity -a chastity that seems to
belong as much to a woman's husband or family as it does to the woman
herself. Little concern is expressed for the physical violation of the
woman - for the violation of her right to bodily integrity, security of the
person and freedom from violence.
In the Court's decisions, chastity becomes synonymous with Indian
women's sexuality, and the need to protect chastity is the basis for the
criminal law's intervention. Furthermore, chastity is understood as the
major impediment facing a victim in laying a rape charge, and in turn, as
a reason for believing the woman's allegations. In listing the implications
for a woman who dares to bring a charge of rape, the Court passively
accepts, rather than challenges these implications. Indeed, by listing and
affirming these implications, the effect of the Court's decision is to
further discourage victims from bringing rape complaints.
A woman's chastity is held out by the Court as a norm, along with
the "honour and dignity of the family" that constitutes the cornerstone of
Indian culture. As a cherished part of Indian culture, it is to be protected
promoted, and so, any violation of a woman's chastity and in turn, of her
family's honour, must therefore be punished. In the Court's view, "a
woman of honour" should value her chastity, and she is therefore expected
to collaborate in upholding the very norms that have been historically
and systematically oppressed.
The problematic assumptions about women's sexuality are seen no
where more clearly than in the coun's compartson of the Indian context
with "the West". It suggests that more stringent rules of corroboration
may be justified in "the West" because Western women attribute no
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value to chastity and are thus more likely to make false allegations of
rape. Implicit in these arguments is the assumption that the more aware
women are of their sexuality and the more obvious they are in the
expression of their sexuality, the less they can be trusted to speak honestly,
and in turn, the more likely they will become to lie about rape.
Feminists must recognise the contradictory nature of the Court's
reasoning. While we welcome the reduction of the corroboration
requirements in rape cases, we must vigilantly reveal and challenge the
problematic assumptions about women's sexuality that continue to inform
these decisions. Feminist understandings of female sexuality, and of
women's rights to control our bodies, stand in stark opposition to the
patriarchal pedestals of "chastity and virginity" - pedestals that are securing
the conviction of rapists at the cost of reinforcing the very assumptions
that subordinate and oppress women.

